How can we give the Charter new validity and impact as an instrument of international politics?
1. The UN Charter, its political approach, and everything it stands for carry little weight in Berlin’s political life today. But Berlin is not alone in clinging to the old pattern of thinking that economic strength also means political strength, and that this in turn confers a claim to leadership. This mindset, however, contradicts the UN Charter. The Charter requires the strong to hold back in the interest of all member states, whether large or small, strong or weak, rich or poor. It merely provides that the great powers bear a special obligation to work together to ensure that all member states observe the prohibition on the use of force. When that prohibition is threatened, Chapters VI and VII clearly prescribe a course of action. So, are the UN the world’s police force?
2. What are the United Nations? The UN is not a world government. It was created in the name of the peoples by government representatives from 50 countries. It is not a monolith but rather a) an intergovernmental organization, b) an international bureaucracy, and c) a forum for state and non-state actors — the latter having a voice but no vote. These different levels influence one another, but what they all have in common is that their effectiveness is limited by the political will of national governments and economic actors in the international arena, and by their willingness to accept and abide by the Charter’s principles. The UN’s executive authority is weak; it is limited to the decisions of the Security Council.
3. Why is that so? The Charter rests on the premise that nation-states voluntarily limit their own power. It was meant to spur the powerful of the world to preserve peace and to mediate — or enable — peaceful conflict resolution. In 1945 it was therefore more an aspiration than a binding obligation. It relied on adherence to procedures and on an advisory judiciary. It counted on governments that placed the wellbeing of their populations above all else and that tolerated state borders and differences in forms of government. But the victors of the Second World War could not agree to continue their alliance, even though the Charter envisaged this and granted the Allies a special status. National interests and the demands of reconstruction and post-colonial development proved stronger, and were reinforced further by the wave of decolonization, which vastly increased the number of nation-states. The UN Secretary-General of the time actively worked to bring all newly independent states into UN membership, though the significance of that membership itself received little attention. Both in San Francisco in 1945 and afterward, the assumption was that once all countries were members, the UN Charter would become the guiding framework of international politics and the prohibition on the use of force would be universally respected. In practice, however, building functioning nation-states became the priority and overshadowed the Charter’s international aspirations and mandate. Even so, one principle holds: while joining the UN is voluntary, complying with the Charter afterward is mandatory. Once a state has joined, and its leadership has accepted the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4), the government is obliged to observe that prohibition in its policies — an obligation that continues even after a change of government.
4. There have been many cases in which the UN Charter was applied successfully. Two examples will illustrate this: in 1956, when Britain and France attacked Egypt, the General Assembly and then the Security Council — with active diplomatic support from Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld — forced the parties to back down. Likewise, a Security Council–authorized, US-led coalition succeeded in ending Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait. But the shift in the geopolitical balance of power after the Soviet collapse in 1989 did not lead to stronger international collective action. The 1990s lacked the impetus for a „San Francisco Conference 2.0.“ With the flagrant violations of the Charter by the US attack on Iraq in 2003 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Charter Article 2.4), the Charter’s guiding claim was finally shattered, as both the General Assembly and the Security Council proved unable to act — chiefly because none of the P5 abide by the Charter. Not to mention the protracted conflicts between Israel and Palestine, and in Sudan, eastern Congo, Myanmar, and Haiti. The Security Council continues to address these conflicts, but its resolutions contribute nothing toward resolving them.
5. What can be done? The repeatedly proposed reform of the Council fails not for lack of consensus on its necessity, but because no member state is yet willing to revive and expand the Charter’s original ambition under today’s geopolitical conditions. China has put forward a Global Governance Initiative, but almost no one has picked up the debate — even though it is sorely needed today. The political fault lines are no longer between socialism and capitalism, democracy and autocracy, progressive and conservative; internationally they run between multilateral and unilateral politics, and domestically between politics oriented around fear, insecurity, hatred, and exclusion or discrimination, and politics that confidently seek to shape the world in the interest of both the individual and the common good — one that keeps an eye on new technologies such as AI and seeks to curb their unchecked deployment by individual companies and oligarchs.
6. The upcoming election of a new Secretary-General offers a chance for change. Three male and five female candidates are running for the position. Some have announced that they intend to deepen and expand the current Secretary-General’s UN80 reform agenda. To do so, they will need the support of the member states — for it is ultimately the member states that determine the UN’s future.
7. Reorganizing the UN: not as a bureaucracy and hub for diplomatic work, but as a think tank and adviser to the powerful of this world. Even so, one should not underestimate the impact a new Secretary-General’s actions can have. He or she can restructure the Secretariat and, with a new team, work to advise member states better on matters of international peace and security. This requires better networking between the Secretariat and peace research institutes and other civil-society forces within member states. Networking matters today just as much as filling leadership positions in a reorganized Secretariat. Crucially, a restructured Secretariat should also bring about a change in tone and style within UN bodies — especially the Security Council — so that they better reflect the Charter’s principles. The point is this: the UN cannot resolve conflicts, but it can help parties look at existing conflicts from a fresh perspective and help identify alternative paths to a solution. Military conflicts are always the result of a political conflict that has been simmering for a long time — and this is precisely where I see room for a new Secretary-General to intervene. Whoever it is, I hope he or she will have the courage to look afresh at today’s conflicts and, using the authority of Article 99, bring findings before the Security Council that can move it to seek a peaceful settlement. We know that no war resolves a political conflict; only sustained efforts to analyze the underlying interests impartially have the potential to find solutions. It should be noted that it is the parties to a conflict who resolve it: the Security Council points to possible paths toward a resolution (Chapter VI) and, if necessary, makes it harder for the parties to refuse those proposals (Chapter VII). It should also be noted that decisions under Chapter VI are binding (Article 25), and that a Council member, that is party to the conflict, is expected to abstain (Article 27.3). Germany, together with the permanent members France and Britain, must press for compliance with these Charter provisions! It is hard to understand why this is not happening. As a basic principle, UN bodies too are obliged to act impartially. The UN will only be able to fulfil its mandate if this is put into practice — for only then can the apparent incompatibility between realpolitik and UN policy be overcome.
8. How can international peace and security be guaranteed today? The United States under Trump poses a challenge in the security domain — interestingly, less so in the search for peace. But he is a one-man show and, as we know, lacks a long-term strategy and staying power, whether on peace or on security. Still, his initiatives occasionally throw up forward-looking elements (a „peace council“ of heads of government), and we should seize on these. His willingness to lift US sanctions on Iran if Tehran meets him halfway on the nuclear-arms question is a development worth exploiting — because sanctions should not be punishment but bargaining chips for returning to diplomatic solutions. That is exactly how the UN Charter defines them (Article 41).
9. Abandoning the wrong political goals. The EU is on the wrong track when it seeks to keep weakening Russia economically through sanctions in order to help Ukraine „win.“ The UN Charter’s approach is clear: it relies simultaneously on diplomacy and on security measures, because the fight must be for conflict resolution, not for the victory or defeat of one side or the other. Military self-defence is permitted (Article 51), but only until diplomatic contact has been established. In other words, a foreign policy grounded in the UN Charter seeks dialogue even during confrontation. The EU therefore needs to find new approaches and deploy individual member states according to their respective competencies. The era of French and German dominance is over. What matters now is finding a modus operandi that brings EU foreign policy closer to the UN and to implementing the UN Charter.
10. Violence as a global epidemic. A book was recently published that views violence as a global epidemic to be countered with epidemiological measures.[1] A reformed UN could serve as the medical team. In this framework, Russian and Ukrainian leaders could be approached through the UN and encouraged to negotiate and agree on a step-by-step resolution of the conflict (Articles 33 and 36). It is striking that the current Secretary-General evidently does not see it this way. The same, of course, applies to the US–Venezuela and US–Cuba conflicts, and to Israel–Palestine. The UN Charter can only be enforced if we build durable alliances among member states to correct violations of the Charter. This requires adherence to an ethical code that seems no longer to exist today. Too often, political leaders come to power through corruption and extend their tenure through ethically dubious maneuvers. Preventing this requires collective action through alliances, together with extensive knowledge of the various forms of violence and how their respective cycles can be broken. The UN Secretariat must possess this knowledge, and needs a Secretary-General prepared for sustained mediation (Article 99).
11. When are international peace and security sustainably achievable? When all member states abide by the peace mandate — the prohibition on the use of force — and violations of this principle are met promptly with collective measures securing it. This is the UN Charter’s concept of security. Not only must the moral authority of UN leadership be respected, but also the political, impartial authority of UN bodies. Violations by individual member states can be met with suspension of UN membership (as was done with South Africa over apartheid) and with collective measures. To achieve this we must commit to institutional reforms and an uncompromising application of the Charter’s provisions, as well as to the further development of multilateral politics. New forms and procedures need to be developed. Setbacks must become a force to keep forging new alliances and building majorities — for only if we succeed at this, will we be able to advance successfully into the other areas the UN Charter saw as underpinning the peace mandate, namely cooperation, tolerance, good neighborliness among states, and the protection of human rights (Article 1).
12. Human rights protection is a major work in progress. Achieving a global implementation of the Universal Declaration will depend crucially on governments and non-state actors also abiding by the Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities. Rather than blaming and shaming, the High Commissioner’s office should observe and support efforts to manage protection better, and should report on both progress and setbacks.
13. The protection of planetary resources this area today makes up a large part of the UN system’s work, yet it is not covered by the Charter at all. The notion still prevails that this is a task for development policy, or for national environmental and energy policy. But the opportunities and threats to human wellbeing posed by climate change and biodiversity loss cannot be successfully contained within a purely national framework. Only national policies oriented toward achieving global goals hold promise of success. New challenges such as AI, and the unchecked power of oligarchs and technology corporations, are still awaiting an adequate response. It would be worthwhile to launch a public debate on the extent to which these developments require changes to the UN Charter.
14. General Conference under Article 109 of the UN Charter: This would be a fitting occasion for a broader public discussion. The preparations would need to be managed very carefully — by the Secretariat, by the member states, and within member states through NGOs, the media, and academia. The new Secretary-General should approach these preparations patiently, with a sense of proportion and staying power. Presumably a series of regional preparatory conferences would be needed to address the following four thematic blocks: 1. When and where has the Charter proven to point the way forward? 2. When and where was it disregarded? 3. Which provisions are obsolete? 4. What is missing from the Charter and should be added? Germany and other middle powers, as well as the EU, should pledge their support for such an approach — for only in this way can there be a shift in the direction of international politics that keeps global peace and security constantly as the highest public good, and orients its actions accordingly.
[1] Gary Slutkin, The End of Violence, 2026
